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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
CONNIE 0. STONE, 
Defendant-Appellant, 
- vs. -
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent. 
Case No. 
10650 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, Connie 0. Stone, former Re-
corder of Layton City, appeals her conviction for 
misuse of public monies in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-28-59 (1953). 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant was charged by information 
filed in the District Court of Davis County with the 
crimes of embezzlement and misuse of public 
funds. Trial was had, during which the embezzle-
ment charge was apparently dismissed, and appel-
lant was convicted of the crime of misuse of public 
funds. 
2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits the conviction should 
be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The general statement of facts set forth in th~ 
appellant's brief is reasonably adequate for the pur-
pose of this appeal. Respondent, however, desires 
to point out the following facts: 
The appellant, Connie Stone, was Layton CHy 
Recorder on or about October 12, 1964. A sum ol 
1 
$2,549.21 was found missing from the Layton Cit/' 
receipts covering sewer, water, swimming pool, ' 
housing, and other funds that the appellant had 
custody over during the period when the funds 1 
were apparently taken by a "lapping process." (T • 
30, 98, 102). i 
The appellant expressly acknowledged that she 
was Layton City Recorder and that her duties and 
responsibilities during the time in question included 
handling money from various accounts and that she 
handled substantial sums of the city's monies (T. 349· 
353). The City Administrator also acknowledged that 
the appellant made bank deposits of city monies in 
many instances and was responsible for handling 
and depositing the city funds (T. 12, 14). 
It further appeared that during the time the so· 
called lapping occurred, appellant would individ· 
ually handle the city funds and make the deposits, 
3 
and an audit for the period disclosed the loss ending 
on October 12, 1964, when the system apparently 
broke down because appellant ceased handling the 
funds. 
Appellant makes no challenge to the sufficiency 
on evidence of her misappropriation and indeed 
none could be made. The facts recited are material 
to the only issues raised by the appellant on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE DISCLOSED APPELLANT WAS A 
PROPER PERSON TO BE CHARGED WITH THE MIS-
USE OF PUBLIC FUNDS IN VIOLATION OF UTAH 
CODE ANN.§ 76-28-59 (1953). 
The evidence clearly shows appellant was the 
Layton City Recorder and while acting in that ca-
pacity received funds from various sources which 
she kept as Layton City monies. It further discloses 
that the city lost funds which appellant had the duty 
to deposit to the City account in a local bank. The 
essence of the appellant's argument is that since she 
had no express statutory duty to receive and deposit 
city monies she could not be convicted under the 
Provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 76-28-59 (1953) as an 
officer of a city "charged with the receipt, safekeep-
ing, transfer or disbursement of public monies" who 
misappropriated them to her own use. 
It is submitted that the construction urged by 
appellant is an overly narrow one. She would ask 
4 
this Court to construe the statute as meaning an oi 
ficer charged "by statute or ordinance." The statu.'.o 
does not say this but says only that the officer mus: 
be a person "charged with the receipt, safekeep\na 
transfer or disbursement of public monies." The ke1· 
word for interpretation in this case is the word 
"charge." Does this mean charged by statute or 
ordinance, or obligated in some other fashions. ln 
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary at 140 (196!), 
the word "charge" is noted to be commensurate 
with obligation or responsibility. Judicial construc-
tions in other contexts have interpreted the word 1 
"charged" to mean given responsibility or obl\ga-
1 
tion. Conference of Major Religious Superiors ol 
Women v. District of Columbia. 348 F.2d 783 (D. C. 
Cir. 1965). "Charge" is often used synonymously · 
with custody, State v. Clark. 86 Me. 194, 29 Atl. 984 •. 
(1893). It is submitted that this is an appropriate con-
struction for the instant statute and in keeping with 
its plain meaning. Every officer who is obligated or 
has custody of public funds, whether the source ol 
the custody or obligation comes from statute, ordi-
nance, or general obligation because of the nature 
of the person's assumed responsibilities should be 
a person "charged with the receipt, safekeeping, 
transfer or disbursement" of public funds properly 
in his custody. The word "charged" should not be 
limited to persons charged by an express statutory 
obligation, but must necessarily encompass publlc 
custodianship resulting from the obligations of the 
office. 
5 
The Utah statute is comparable to Cal. Pen. Code 
! 424 (West Supp. 1966). In People v. Pearson, 11 Cal. 
App. 2d 123, 52 P.2d 971 (Dist. Ct. App. 1936), the 
court ruled their provision was applicable to an em· 
ployee in the sales tax division of the State Board of 
Equalization even though there apparently was no 
express statutory or other requirement that the em· 
ployee receive public funds, but the duty was im-
posed by the nature of his employment. 
The case of McMillin v. Emery. 59 Utah 553, 205 
Pac. 892 (1922), does not warrant a contrary construc-
tion of the statute since in that case the Court ex-
pressly found that a deputy county treasurer was a 
person charged with the safekeeping of public 
monies because a statute expressly imposed on him 
the same obligations as the treasurer. Anything else 
in the opinion is the grossest form of dicta. How-
ever, the basic premise that some of the dicta of Mc-
Millin is based, that penal statutes are to be narrow-
ly construed to the subject described therein is not 
an applicable principle for two reasons: (1) the 
statute does encompass persons charged with safe-
keeping public funds and is not by its express terms 
limited to those charged by law and "law" is not 
limited to statute or ordinance, and (2) Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-1-2 (1953) expressly rejects the concept of 
narrow construction of penal statutes and requires 
that they be construed "according to the fair import 
of their terms" and to "effect the objects of the 
statutes and to promote justice." 
Taking the above axiom of construction, the in-
terpretation urged by appellant is not proper since 
6 
the intent of Utah Code Ann. § 76-28-59 (1953) w~s 
to protect the public treasury and public funds. The 
construction urged by appellant would have the 
opposite effect. The same may be said for the de. 
cision of State v. Meyers, 56 Ohio St. 340, 47 N.E. 13~ 
(1897), cited by appellant and referred to in the Mc. 
Millin case. 
Secondly, it is submitted that there was sufli. 
cient legal obligation imposed on the appellant as 
Layton City Recorder to sustain the conviction even 
if the ultraconservative construction of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-28-59 (1953) urged by appellant is accepted. 
Utah Const. art. XIII,§ 8 provides: 
The making of profit out of public monies, or 
using the same for any purpose not authorized by 
law, by any public officer, shall be deemed a felony, 
and shall be punished as provided by law, but part 
of such punishment shall be disqualification to hold 
public office. 
Thus, appellant, who is clearly a public officer 
(cf. Utah Code Ann.§ 10-6-30 (1962)) was obligatednot 
to use the fees collected for her own use, but to put 
them to their public charge. In failing to do so she 
committed a constitutional felony since the above 
section is self-executing and also imposes a legal 
obligation on the appellant. 
The testimony before the trial court clearly 
shows appellant received receipts and fees paid by 
citizens for water, sewer, rental, and other services. 
Utah Const. art. XXL § 2 also provides: 
But all other State, district, county, city, town 
and school officers, shall be required by law to keep 
7 
::i. true and correct account of all fees collected by 
them, and to pay the same into the proper treas-
ury .... 
Thus, appellant was legally obligated by the above 
constitutional provisions to pay the fees coming into 
hor hands over to the city treasury, which she did 
not do. Neither of the above cited sections were in-
volved in McMillin since there was a statute directly 
applicable to the official therein involved, nor were 
the above provisions argued in the Warden's brief. 
Certainly, the Constitution provides an adequate 
basis upon which to say a city recorder is obligated 
to keep funds received by him. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-84 (1962) authorizes cities 
to pass ordinances for the general welfare of its 
citizens and the preservation of city property. The 
city council by ordinance can regulate duties and 
obligations of city personnel towards city funds. The 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-10-60, -63, -71, -73 
0962) are not exclusive and a recorder may be re-
quired to perform other duties not inconsistent with 
law. As noted in appellant's brief, section 3-27 of the 
Layton City Ordinances requires the city recorder 
to pay into the treasury all monies coming into his 
hands by virtue of his office. Other provisions of the 
Ordinances required the recorder to receive and 
keep proper custody of Layton City funds, 3-28-34 
Layton City Ordinances. These Ordinances are not 
inconsistent with State law since they can be con-
strued as requiring the Recorder to account for 
funds he receives by virtue of his office. Appellant 
says none of the funds she received came by virtue 
8 
of her office. To the contrary, the evidence of recor" 
• 0 
clearly demonstrates she received the monies she 
took only by virtue of duties she was performing as 
Layton City Recorder. Consequently, there is no 
merit to appellant's contention. 
Finally, it is submitted that if Utah Code Ann.: 
76-28-59 (1953) is going to be construed as meaning 
"charged according to law" and the Court rejects 
what has been noted above, the term law may be 
construed to mean the whole body of law of Utah 
including the common law. The rule is clear tha1 
public officers receiving public funds in the course 
of their employment have a duty to keep them 
safely. 43 Am. Jur. Public Officers § 309 (1942). This 
duty is judicially imposed in part by common law 
principle. Matter of Bird v. McGoldrick. 277 N.Y 
492, 14 N.E. 2d 805 (1938); cf. 2 Bishop, Criminal Law 
§§ 328, 329 (9th ed. 1923). In Regina v. Baxter. 5 Cox. 
302 (1851), a police superintendent was charged with 
embezzlement as a public officer of funds he was 
not entitled to receive as a police superintendent, 
but which he received because of the administrative 
practice of handling the funds. The court, although 
not passing on the issue directly because of a flaw 
in the indictment, indicated there may be a sufficient 
constructive receipt of the funds to warrant prosecu· 
tion. In any event it is submitted there was a suffi· 
cient obligation on the part of the appellant as city 
recorder to have imposed a public charge on her 
to safeguard the funds she received, and she could 
be criminally liable under the applicable statute foT 
9 
having violated her charge imposed by the law of 
fiduciary relationships. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN 
THE INSTRUCTIONS IT GAVE TO THE JURY. 
The appellant contends the trial court committed 
prejudicial error in giving instructions numbers one 
and five, subsections one and two. It is submitted 
there is no merit to the position. 
First, no exception was taken to the instructions 
given by the court. It is well settled in this jurisdic-
tion that the failure to raise exceptions to instruc-
tions given precludes review on appeal unless the 
instructions are so obviously prejudicial that a fair 
trail could not be had. Utah Code Ann. § 77-37-1 
0953); State v. Cobo, 90 Utah 89, 60 P.2d 952 (1936). 
Since no exception was taken to the instructions, no 
claim of prejudicial error can now be raised as the 
instructions given were in no way so defective as to 
support the exception to the requirement of an ex-
ception as articulated in the Cobo case. 
Instruction number one merely advises the jury 
of the nature of the charge against the appellant. 
No place in the argument portion of the appellant's 
brief is there any explanation of why instruction 
number one was not appropriate. Consequently, 
there can be no basis for a claim of error by the trial 
court in giving instruction number one. 
Instruction number five, subsections one and 
two, of which the appellant complains, charged that 
10 
before the jury could find the appellant guilty thev 
must have found beyond a reasonable doubt (a) 
that appellant was the Layton City Recorder and (bi 
that she was charged with the receipt, safekeepinq 
transfer, and disbursement of public monies. Cer 
tainly one of the facts the jury had to find was th2 
appellant was the Layton City Recorder because the 
information charged that her misappropriation oc-
curred while she was serving in that capacity. Ap-
pellant's basic contention was that the jury was 
instructed that they must find whether appellanl 
was charged with the receipt of safekeeping o! 
public monies. Appellant contends this is an issue . 
of law and the court should have instructed that she 
was or was not so obligated. Whether the issue was 
one of law or fact depends on the construction to be 
given Utah Code Ann. § 76-28-59 ( 1953). If the ap 
pellant's contention is correct that the Layton City 
Recorder is not so obligated as the provisions ol 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-28-59 (1953) require, a directed 
verdict was in order. If she was so charged, submit-
ting the issue to the jury as a question of fact could 
not have been prejudicial to the appellant since: (1) 
If appellant was charged with the obligation towards 
the public monies as a matter of law by instructing 
the jury that they had to so find, the court merely 
gave the jury an opportunity to determine the issue 
in appellant's favor rather than have the court di-
rectly advise the jury against appellant, and (2) iL 
as one of the theories of construction of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-28-59 (1953) advanced by respondent is cor 
rect, that the obligation for the funds need not arise 
11 
by law or statute but because the relationship of the 
officer to the funds, the issue would be one of fact 
and properly submitted to the jury on that basis. In 
either event the instruction could not have preju-
diced the appellant. 
Finally, appellant notes that in instruction num-
ber four, wherein the court instructed the jury in the 
language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-28-59 (1953), the 
court left out the words "or every other person." The 
elimination of these words was the elimination of 
unnecessary verbage. The appellant was charged 
in the information as an officer of Layton City, not 
as an otherwise unidentified person. Consequently, 
by not giving the unnecessary language the court 
more properly tailored the statutory language to the 
case before the jury. This was a proper action for 
the trial court to take. State v. Thompson, 110 Utah 
113, 170 P.2d 153 (1946). 
The allegations of error in the trial court's in-
structions are in no way supportive of a claim for 
reversal. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN RULING ON THE ADMISSION OF EVI-
DENCE. 
The appellant contends that in twelve instances 
the trial court received evidence without proper 
foundation, but then goes on to cite only three claims 
in her brief. Therefore, it must be concluded that ail 
the other claimed evidentiary errors are abandoned. 
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The first objection goes to the admission of Ex 
hibit B. The record reflects State's Exhibit B to be 
the original of deposit slips kept by the First National 
Bank of Layton as part of their records and were 30 
identified by a bank officer (T. 69). The officer als, 
identified the deposit slips as having the depos!l 
number of Layton City on them. The officer of the 
bank was able to identify each slip as part of the 
bank records by an initial on each slip (R. 70). Th2 
exhibits were offered, and objected to, and admitted 
without conditions (R. 72). The court then held an 
out-of-court hearing where counsel for appellar:'. 
further defined his objection to the exhibit because . 
of some markings by the F.B.I. laboratory and an · 
order that the Layton City police were to have 
turned the exhibit over to the court (R. 73, 74). The 
objection was apparently only as to chain of custody. 
The court overruled the objection and gave appel-
lant the right to renew the objection. It was not re-
newed, and thus must be deemed abandoned. In 
McCormick, Evidence § 58 (1954) it is noted: 
... the everyday method of handling the situation 
when the adversary objects to the relevancy or the 
competency of the offered fact is to permit it to 
come in conditionally, upon the assurance, express 
or implied, of the offering counsel that he will 'con-
nect up' the tendered evidence by proving, in the 
later progress of his case, the missing facts. 
In a long trial, however, where the witnesses 
are many and the facts complex, it is easy for the 
offering counsel to forgd the need for making the 
required 'connecting' proof, and for the judge and 
the adversary to fail to observe this gam in the 
evidence. Who invokes the condition subsequent, 
13 
upon such breach? The burden is placed upon the 
objecting party to renew the objection and invoke 
the condition .... [Emphasis added. J 
Since appellant did not renew her objection, 
the matter must be deemed abandoned and no claim 
of error can be had. Further, the exhibit was admis-
sible as a business record since the only showing 
of a break in custody was appellant counsel's state-
ment. Finally, the evidence otherwise contained in 
the exhibit was before the jury in other documents 
(see exhibits D & A) and hence no prejudice could 
occur. 
Exhibit 0 was identified as a monthly transmit-
tal of Layton City's retirement and group insurance 
for January and February, 1965 (T. 145). The hand-
writing on the exhibit was appellant's (T. 145). Ex-
hibit P was an employee withholding exemption 
certificate also bearing appellant's signature (T. 146). 
Exhibit Q was an analysis of employees' gross earn-
ings (T. 146). It was identified as prepared by the 
appellant (T. 146). The documents were admitted 
again subject to connecting up as to materiality (T. 
147). On cross-examination appellant's counsel 
proved the items to have been taken from the Lay-
ton City files. No subsequent motion was made to 
strike and it does not appear that they in any way 
would confuse the issues otherwise before the 
court. There could be no claim of prejudice for lack 
of reasonable foundation or claim of prejudice be-
cause of gross immateriality that might have in-
flamed the jury. Indeed nowhere in appellant's brief 
14 
is there any explanation of how any prejudice could 
have occurred on any of the items of evidence. 
Exhibit V was a carbon copy of a bank deposli 
slip of Layton City identified as prepared by Mau. 
rine Thurston (T. 208). The word "October" was writ· 
ten on the slip, but counsel indicated he did not 
know who put that notation on it. The court struck 
I 
any reference to the written non-carbon portion ol 
the exhibit (T. 210). The witness who identified the 
exhibit was a Layton City employee. The exhibit 
was otherwise relevant. Maurine Thurston during 1 
her testimony identified exhibit V as a carbon bank 
deposit slip apparently of Layton City (T. 267). She 
acknowledged preparing it. She testified the deposlt 
slip was made out during the relevant period in 
question (T. 268). She said it was in October, 1964, 
when she started to make out deposit slips (T. 268, 
269). On objection to the offer of the exhibit that it 
was not identified as to date, the court noted what 
had been established and that the approximate date 
was established from her testimony (T. 270). Con· 
cerning the objection as to the word "October" on 
the exhibit, the court in keeping with its previous 
ruling admitted it but it was offered without ref· 
erence to the word "October" (T. 271). No subse-
quent motion to strike was made. Since the wit· 
nesses testimony as to the time of preparation of the 
exhibit was before the court, and it was expressly 
offered without reference to the notation of "Oc-
tober," there is no basis by which appellant can 
complain of any error. 
15 
The instant trial was long and many objections 
of a technical and argumentative nature faced the 
trial court. He handled them well and did not exceed 
the limits of his discretion. No showing of substan-
tia.l prejudice to the rights of appellant had been 
demonstrated and therefore no basis for reversal 
exists. Utah Code Ann. § 77-41-1 (1953). 
CONCLUSION 
This appeal presents only one real issue for con-
sideration by this Court and that is the appropriate 
construction to be given to Utah Code Ann. § 76-28-59 
(] 953), in light of the facts of this case. The other 
claims of error are of innocuous propositions con-
taining no jurisprudential significance. 
The respondent submits that the one major issue 
is so structured on this appeal that in any event, no 
matter how Utah Code Ann. § 76-28-59 (1953) is con-
strued the conviction must be affirmed. However, 
the respondent submits that that statute should be 
construed with reasonable latitude since the real in-
tention of the Legislature was to protect the public 
treasury. 
This Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
Attorney for Plaintiff-
Respondent 
State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
